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SOBER ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY AND 
THE INTELLIGENT DESIGNER
John Beaudoin
Intelligent design theorists claim that their theory is neutral as to the identity 
of the intelligent designer, even with respect to whether it is a natural or a 
supernatural agent. In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Elliott Sober has 
argued that in fact the theory is not neutral on this issue, and that it entails the 
existence of a supernatural designer. I examine Sober's argument and identify 
several hurdles it must overcome.
Proponents of Intelligent Design Theory (IDT) declare that it is no part of 
their theory to identify the designer implicated in the origin of some of the 
intricate structures found in nature. Most of the theory's leading defend­
ers are candid in confessing to a personal belief that the designer is a deity, 
the God of Christianity. But, they declare, this personal belief is just that: 
a personal belief that is no part of the theory itself, any more than some 
cosmologist's belief that God initiated the Big Bang is for that reason part 
of the Big Bang theory. Michael Behe expresses the point this way:
[W]hile I argue for design, the question of the identity of the designer 
is left open. Possible candidates for the role of designer include: the 
God of Christianity; an angel-fallen or not; Plato's demiurge; some 
mystical new age force; space aliens from Alpha Centauri; time trav­
elers; or some utterly unknown intelligent being. Of course, some 
of these possibilities may seem more plausible than others based on 
information from fields other than science. Nonetheless, as regards 
the identity of the designer, modern ID theory happily echoes Isaac 
Newton's phrase hypothesis non fingo.1
Critics have alleged that this unwillingness explicitly to identify God as the 
intelligent designer is a sham: a thinly-veiled political tactic formulated in 
the wake of several court defeats for scientific creationists, by those who 
seek to have IDT introduced into public school biology classrooms, and 
who want to mainstream their view by publishing in respected scientific 
journals. Of course the motives of design theorists, political or not, are be­
side the point, philosophically speaking. We want to know whether in fact 
ID theory entails anything about the designer, and what mainly concerns 
both proponents and critics of intelligent design is the general question 
about whether the designer is a supernatural agent, since for most of the 
theory's critics that would be enough to undermine any legitimate claim
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the theory might otherwise have had on the status of a genuine science, 
even without any other theological embellishments. Since Behe mentions 
certain embodied beings as candidates for the role of designer, clearly 
his position is that IDT does not require the designer to be supernatural, 
much less a deity.2 The question is whether logically he is entitled to hold 
that position.
I.
Elliott Sober has argued that IDT is not in fact neutral on the subject of 
whether the designer is a supernatural being, because IDT entails the exis­
tence of such a being when it is combined with certain assumptions we are 
independently justified in accepting. He offers us the following definition 
of what it means for a proposition to have implications about whether 
supernatural beings exist:
(E) Proposition P now has implications about the existence of su­
pernatural beings if and only if there exist auxiliary assumptions 
A such that (i) P & A entails that there are supernatural beings, or 
entails that there are none, but A by itself does not have either impli­
cation, (ii) A is true, (iii) we now are justified in believing A , and (iv) 
the justification we now have for believing A does not depend on 
believing that P is true (or that it is false), and also does not depend 
on believing that there are supernatural beings (or on believing that 
there are none).3
According to Sober, IDT's4 central thesis is the following proposition:
1. If a system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was 
caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
Sober now proceeds to show that (1) entails the existence of a supernatural 
designer when it is combined with propositions ((2), (4), (6), (7), below) 
that meet the conditions for auxiliaries described in (E).
2. Some of the minds found in nature are irreducibly complex.
3. Therefore some of the minds found in nature were caused to ex­
ist by an intelligent designer.
4. Any mind in nature that designs and builds an irreducibly com­
plex system is itself irreducibly complex. 5678
5. If the universe is finitely old and if cause precedes effect, then at 
least one of the minds found in nature was not created by any 
mind found in nature.
6. The universe is finitely old.
7. Causes precede their effects.
8. Therefore, there exists a supernatural intelligent designer.
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Sober argues for (2) by referring to the way in which beliefs, memories, 
sense perceptions, desires and intentions each play a vital role in the func­
tioning of a human mind, such that removal of any one of these would 
render it unable to function—the defining feature of an irreducibly com­
plex system. The other auxiliaries seem unassailable, with the possible 
exception of (4), but we can stipulate to it here. Since the auxiliaries, in 
combination with what Sober offers as the central thesis of IDT, entail the 
existence of a supernatural designer, it follows according to (E) that IDT is 
not neutral on this matter, even if it does not entail the existence of a being 
having all of the familiar attributes of the Christian God.
II.
Sober's argument raises two general questions. The first question is about 
whether he succeeds in showing that IDT entails the existence of a super­
natural designer. The second question is about what, if anything, follows 
from an affirmative answer to the first question, specifically in respect 
to the public policy issues that make the first question important. Since 
Sober does not take up this second issue I will ignore it as well, except to 
make the obvious point that IDT's entailing the existence of a supernatu­
ral designer will not at once settle these issues. What we decide on these 
further issues will depend on how we answer certain basic questions in 
fields ranging from philosophy of science to Establishment Clause juris­
prudence. A considerable literature already exists on these matters.5
Regarding the first question, I see two challenges that Sober's argument 
must overcome. First, what he offers as the central thesis of IDT—proposi- 
tion (1) in the above argument—seems not to in fact be the view's central 
thesis, even when (1) is suitably modified and interpreted. I'll address this 
issue in the next section. The second challenge calls attention to the fact 
that Sober appears to presuppose what Behe (whose notion of irreducible 
complexity Sober uses) seems not to grant, at least not explicitly: the ap­
plicability of (1) to systems in nature that are minds.
Suppose Sober is correct to characterize some minds in nature as irre- 
ducibly complex, and suppose as well that his proposition (4) is correct: any 
mind capable of imposing irreducible complexity on something else would 
itself have to be irreducibly complex. Still, in order to secure his conclusion, 
Sober must assume that any irreducibly complex mind must have its irre­
ducible complexity imposed upon it, directly or indirectly, by an intelligence, 
a proposition distinct from (4), and that is true only if proposition (1) ap­
plies as much to natural systems that are minds as it does to bodies.6
That Behe does not mean to include minds in the range of (1) is sug­
gested, although not strictly entailed, by the facts (i) that none of his exam­
ples of irreducibly complex systems in nature are minds; (ii) he requires 
of the parts of irreducibly complex systems that they be "well-matched," 
and the examples he uses to illustrate this concept all involve the spatial 
properties of the parts of the systems, making it difficult to see how the 
concept could be applied to mental parts such as beliefs and desires;7 and 
(iii) Behe explicitly states that irreducible complexity is a sign of intelligent 
design when it is found in physical systems with physically interacting parts.8 
Where the parts of the system do not physically interact, Behe states, the
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intervention of intelligence must be detected "in other ways."9 So it ap­
pears that Behe would replace (1) with (1*) if  a physical system found in na­
ture is irreducibly complex, then it was caused to exist by an intelligent designer. 
Is that an arbitrary restriction of the principle? It's not clear that it is. The 
design theorist could claim that while we know enough about biochem­
istry to assert (1) of structures such as flagella,10 we simply don't know 
enough about the way mental parts come together to form minds that we 
can assert with confidence the impossibility of beliefs, desires, memories, 
etc. being joined together by unintelligent means to form a mind.
If it is no part of IDT to posit the applicability of (1) to minds, then 
Sober has a problem: there are naturalistic hypotheses consistent with (1*) 
that stop the regress of explanation to a supernatural designer. If Sober's 
argument is to work, then he must adduce auxiliary propositions that, 
in combination with (1*), eliminate any such hypothesis from contention. 
Consider one example of such an hypothesis: the irreducible complexity 
in such structures as the flagellum was imposed on it by an alien intel­
ligence with an irreducibly complex mind that supervenes on a physical 
brain that evolved by purely Darwinian means — a physical brain that is 
not itself an irreducibly complex structure. Behe supplies hypothetical ex­
amples of such creatures:
[P]erhaps the original life is totally unlike ourselves, consisting of 
fluctuating electrical fields or gases; perhaps it does not require ir- 
reducibly complex structures to sustain it.11
This hypothesis halts the regress of intelligent designers at an alien intel­
ligence, and nothing in (1*) rules it out. Sober must advance auxiliaries to 
rule it out, or concede that IDT does not lead us ineluctably to a super­
natural designer.
Sober could argue that some mind-body identity thesis is correct, so that 
mental systems are physical systems. Or he could argue that irreducibly 
complex minds, if they are emergent phenomena, could only supervene 
on irreducibly complex physical systems. If the latter is true, then since ac­
cording to (1*) irreducibly complex physical systems can only issue from 
intelligence, the irreducibly complex minds that emerge from these physi­
cal systems are themselves always indirectly the products of intelligence.
In this project, ironically enough, Sober is likely to enjoy the help of 
design theorists. After all, given their personal convictions doubtless they 
too want to reject the alien hypothesis, along with any other hypothesis 
that halts the regress of intelligent designers in the same way. If the auxil­
iary assumptions needed to rule out the alien hypothesis are not available, 
then so much the worse for Sober's argument, but so much the worse as 
well for design theorists who hope that a compelling natural theology can 
be started where design theory leaves off.12
III.
Assume for argument's sake that the needed auxiliaries can be found, 
and that (1*) in combination with these auxiliaries and those already sup­
plied by Sober entails the existence of a supernatural designer. Then if  (1*)
436 Faith and Philosophy
really is the central thesis of IDT, it follows by (E) that IDT is not neutral 
as to the metaphysical status of the designer. This brings us back to the 
first challenge I mentioned for Sober's argument: that what Sober offers as 
its central thesis-proposition (1)—is not in fact the central thesis of IDT, 
even when modified to (1*).13 This challenge can now be cast as consisting 
of three claims:
• (1) is not the central thesis of IDT, even when modified to (1*).
• (1*) plays a central role in a justification for intelligent design theory 
that most design theorists use, but it is not clear what that entails 
vis-a-vis the commitments of the theory itself.
• Design theorists advance multiple arguments for their view, some 
of which do not use (1*), or they do not make an argument with (1*) 
carry all or most of the evidential burden.
Consider two statements, from Behe and William Dembksi, respectively, 
that appear to express IDT's central claim:
To a person who does not feel obliged to restrict his search to unintel­
ligent causes, the straightforward conclusion is that many biochemical 
systems were designed. They were designed not by the laws of nature, 
not by chance and necessity; rather, they were planned. . . . Life on 
earth at its most fundamental level, in its most critical components, 
is the product of intelligent activity.14
As a theory of biological origins and development, intelligent de­
sign's central claim is that only intelligent causes adequately explain 
the complex, information-rich structures of biology and that these 
causes are empirically detectable.15
These authors appear to treat (1*) not as IDT's central thesis, but rather 
as a general principle that would figure in a developed general science of 
intelligent design detection, a science that would supply us with rules to 
follow in detecting intelligence in a wide variety of contexts, from arson 
investigation to SETI.16 Intelligent design theorists frequently allude to 
the need to develop such a science, suggesting, plausibly enough, that 
probably it would codify the same rules we use intuitively every day 
to detect the workings of intelligence. That Behe regards the italicized 
phrase in the first quote as IDT's real thesis, and something like (1*) as just 
a familiar inference rule, is suggested in his remarks that "inferring that 
biochemical systems were designed by an intelligent agent is a humdrum 
process that requires no new principles of logic or science," just "consid­
eration of the way in which we reach conclusions of design every day." 
It is almost as if Behe treats Sober's (1*) like modus ponens—an inference 
principle used in arguments for his theory, but not in any ordinary sense 
part of the theory itself.
So what design theorists tell us are two things:
(i) There are generally reliable rules for determining of things whether 
they are the products of intelligence. Codifying such rules is the
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proper subject matter of what might be called the science of intelligent 
design.
(ii) When the science of intelligent design is applied to some of the 
structures we find in nature (such as bacterial flagella), we find that 
these structures are the products of intelligent design. That these 
structures are products of intelligence is the central thesis (label it 
IBD) of the theory of intelligent biological design.17
It seems that when design theorists claim that their theory is neutral as 
to the identity of the designer they have in mind IBD as the central thesis 
of their view. When they proclaim that IBD is neutral on the subject of 
the designer's identity they mean that IBD is logically consistent with any 
number of naturalistic scenarios, and that it is not the business of design 
theory to discover whether any of these is tenable. Sober, on the other 
hand, is interested in whether the theory of intelligent biological design is 
neutral on this subject in the sense of neutrality expressed by (E).
Now, if Sober can show that IBD, combined with suitable auxilia­
ries, entails the existence of a supernatural designer, then his thesis 
still stands. But it seems he cannot do this, for there is no way to move 
from IBD to a supernatural designer without employing as auxiliaries 
certain propositions the truth of which Sober is not likely to concede 
(such as that no designing intelligence could evolve by purely Darwin­
ian means), which means that by his own lights they could not serve as 
auxiliaries. As we have seen, for example, it is at least conceivable that 
structures such as the flagellum were designed by an alien intelligence 
that seeded life on earth. In order to show that these aliens could only 
be a link in a chain of intelligent causes that leads back ultimately to a 
supernatural designer one would have to demonstrate with auxiliaries 
that no alien intelligence capable of this feat could itself have evolved 
by purely natural means. And this is where we will need the sort of 
premise the truth of which Sober is likely to reject, rendering it off limits 
as an auxiliary.
This brings us back again to (1*). Sober's argument still succeeds if it 
is plausible, by virtue of the role it plays in the main argument design 
theorists give for IBD, to treat (1*) as in some way part of intelligent design 
theory, or part of the IBD research paradigm. Here arise the last two parts 
of the three-part challenge I described above. Consider the last of these: 
arguments for IBD based on propositions other than (1*) can be found 
in design theory literature. Dembski argues from a more general feature 
called specified complexity, of which irreducible complexity is supposed 
to be one species. Meyer et al., mention as an indicator of intelligent de­
sign a "top down pattern [found in the fossils from the Cambrian explo­
sion] of innovation in which large-scale morphological disparity arises 
before small-scale diversity."18 Paul Nelson and Jonathan Wells appeal to 
the phenomenon of homology as evidence for IBD.19 Some of these argu­
ments may employ propositions that actually lead us to a supernatural 
designer more clearly than does (1*), but there is no guarantee of that, 
nor any guarantee that all such arguments will employ propositions that 
get us there in one way or another. What if design theorists use several 
arguments to support IBD, and only one of them utilizes a proposition
that, combined with propositions that meet Sober's criteria for auxiliaries, 
entails the existence of a supernatural designer?20
Of course, the diversity of arguments marshaled for IBD by design 
theorists is not a problem for Sober if none of those that do not refer to 
irreducible complexity has any plausibility. In other words, if the only 
plausible way to argue for IBD is by use of a premise that combined with 
auxiliaries leads to a supernatural designer, then effectively the theory is 
not neutral on this question. But Sober does not argue for the implausi- 
bility of any alternative arguments for IBD, or suggest explicitly that no 
plausible alternatives are on the horizon.
Suppose for argument's sake that all of the primary arguments design 
theorists give for IBD do employ at least one proposition that entails the 
existence of a supernatural designer when combined with propositions 
that meet Sober's criteria for auxiliaries. Then the theory of intelligent bio­
logical design entails the existence of a supernatural designer if it is rea­
sonable to say that the theory (or paradigm, or research program, if these 
more expansive concepts are helpful here) encompasses the methodologi­
cal principles that are used by design theorists to identify structures as in­
telligently designed. Is this reasonable? It appears to be. This is especially 
true given the contested status of these principles (such as (1*)), Behe's 
claim that inferring design requires no new principles of logic or science 
notwithstanding.21 If , on the other hand, IBD is evidenced (adequately) in 
some cases without any recourse to propositions that entail a supernatural 
designer according to (E), then any attempt to draw conclusions about 
design theory's logical commitments vis-a-vis the designer will have to be 
undertaken on a case-by-case basis, perhaps distinguishing several ver­
sions of the theory. In this case, Sober's thesis is correct, but only when 
aimed at certain versions of design theory. 22
Lest we begin to miss the forest for the trees in these logical exercises, 
it is worth observing that whether or not we can formulate some notion of 
a theory or research tradition that permits us to say in a strict sense that 
the theory of intelligent biological design entails the existence of a super­
natural designer, might from a practical standpoint be beside the point. 
It remains the case that if one cannot discuss the evidential basis of this 
theory, or carry out research under this paradigm, without referring to a 
set of contested principles that, when their entailments are worked out, 
lead us to the supernatural, then a supernatural figure will always loom 
large in treatments of design theory, like an elephant in the room that IBD 
researchers qua IBD researchers decline to talk about. Whether and how 
that fact should bear on design theory's claim on the status of a science, 
and on the related issues of public policy, remains to be settled.
Northern Illinois University
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NOTES
1. Michael Behe, “The Modern Intelligent Design Hypothesis," Philoso- 
phia Christi 3 (2001), p. 165. Cf. William Dembski in The Design Revolution:
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Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design (Intervarsity Press, 
2004, p. 188): “[F]rom the vantage of intelligent design, treated strictly as a 
scientific inquiry, no theological or antitheological position has a privileged 
place. Intelligent design, as a scientific research program, attempts to deter­
mine whether certain features of the natural world exhibit signs of having 
been designed by an intelligence. This intelligence could be E.T. or a telic prin­
ciple immanent in nature or a transcendent personal agent. These are all, at 
least initially, live options." See also Appendix A of the amicus brief filed by 
the Discovery Institute in the case of Kitzmiller v Dover Area School District, 
available on the website of the Discovery Institute. In this document there is 
a curious vacillation in the many quotes taken from design theorists between 
claiming that identifying the designer is beyond the purview of intelligent 
design theory, claiming that it is beyond the purview of science, period, and 
intimating that if one seeks to link the designer in IDT with the god of some 
religion, then one must go beyond science into the realms of philosophy and 
religion. Clearly only the first and last theses can be maintained by a design 
theorist consistently with their claim not to be committed to anything as to 
the designer's metaphysical nature. The suggestion that identification of the 
designer lies beyond science in general could only rest on knowledge of the 
designer's nature that, by hypothesis, we don't have.
2. Dembski has suggested that the designer referred to in ID theory need 
not be real: it could in principle be treated by design theorists as a mere useful 
fiction, if that should better fit with a particular design theorist's philosophy 
of science. For convenience I will leave this suggestion aside and assume that 
for most if not all intelligent design theorists the designer really exists. For 
Dembski's remarks see No Free Lunch (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 15; cf. 
The Design Revolution, p. 65.
3. Elliott Sober, “Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural: The 
'God or Extra-Terrestrials' Reply," Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), p. 78.
4. Or rather what Sober refers to as the “mini-ID" thesis, which is IDT 
stripped of any explicit description of the designing agent.
5. See, for example, the discussion by Del Ratzsch in his Nature, Design, 
and Science (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). On the legal 
issues (vis-a-vis design theory in public school classrooms), see Francis Beck­
with, Law, Darwinism, and Public Education (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little­
field, 2003); Eugenie Scott and Glenn Branch, Not in Our Classrooms (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2006); and the opinion by Judge Jones in the Kitzmiller case (U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2005), available online 
at http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/kitzmiller_v_dover.html.
6. An exception might be made for any minds whose irreducible com­
plexity never had a first origination, if there any such minds.
7. See Behe's “Self-Organization and Irreducibly Complex Systems: A Re­
ply to Shanks and Joplin," Philosophy of Science 67 (2000), p. 157; cf. Dembski 
in No Free Lunch, p. 283. Behe illustrates his point about well-matched parts 
with an example of a system in which the parts are not well-matched: “To­
gether a lever and fulcrum form an interactive system which can be used to 
move weights. Nonetheless, the parts of the system can have a wide variety of 
shapes and sizes and still function. Because the system is not well-matched, 
it could easily have been formed by chance." Behe's example (p. 158) of a bio­
logical system with well-matched parts again makes reference to the spatial 
properties of the parts: “thrombin selects [a] particular bond for cleavage out 
of literally hundreds of thousands of peptide bonds in its environment and 
ignores almost all others. It can do this because the shape of thrombin is well- 
matched to the shape of fibrinogen around the bond it cleaves."
8. Darwin's Black Box, pp. 194, 223.
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9. See Darwin's Black Box, chap. 9, note 3. Here he refers to the work of 
Dembksi on specified complexity, which I will mention in Section III.
10. If Behe were to suggest that irreducible complexity is necessarily the 
product of intelligence, and that this connection is one we know a priori, such 
that there is no need even to consider the candidate Darwinian explanations 
for irreducible complexity in biological systems, then he could not avoid us­
ing Sober's (1). But I don't find Behe making that claim, and most of Darwin's 
Black Box is devoted to Behe's critique of the Darwinian explanations (cf. his 
remarks near the bottom of p. 203). So he is claiming to know from experi­
ence that irreducible complexity in physical systems is a good indicator of 
intelligence. As for irreducible complexity in non-phsyical systems, he might 
simply claim not to have sufficient data on which to make a claim one way or 
the other about the need for intelligence here. The nearest I find Behe com­
ing to something like (1) is on p. 204, at which he states that “Our ability to 
be confident of the design of the cilium or intracellular transport rests on the 
same principles as our ability to be confident of the design of anything: the 
ordering of separate components to achieve an identifiable function that de­
pends sharply on the components." It's not clear how Behe squares the use of 
'anything' here with his remarks in the note referenced in note 9, above.
11. Darwin's Black Box, p. 249.
12. An anonymous referee suggests that Sober's argument might benefit 
from referring (presumably in premise 2) to systems that are a complex of 
brain and mind together. It's not clear to me whether a system such as this 
can be described as irreducibly complex, however, especially if the mental 
components of it are mere epiphenomena. We would have to specify care­
fully the function of this system (Sober claims the mind's function is to enable 
us effectively to navigate through our environment; cf. Behe on identifying 
functions in Darwin's Black Box, p. 196), and then it must be the case that 
removal of any mental part or physical part from this system would destroy 
the function. Finally, it must be claimed that any such system as this could 
only issue from an intelligent cause—that (1) is applicable to systems such 
as this. As I mentioned above, it's not clear that we know enough about such 
systems to make this claim; we are much more familiar with purely physical 
irreducible systems.
13. Sober states that he refers to irreducible complexity in Behe's sense, but 
as Dembski points out in No Free Lunch, proposition (1) is probably false where 
the crucial term is used in Behe's sense. Recall that irreducible complexity is 
not about the number of parts a thing has, but the way in which each part is 
crucial to the object's functioning (at least when the parts are 'non-arbitrarily' 
individuated, as Dembski puts it; cf. Sober's discussion of the individuation 
issue in his article). Dembski concedes that for an irreducibly complex object 
with very few parts, it is not impossible that purely Darwinian mechanisms 
might produce it “in one fell swoop." Dembski proceeds (pp. 279-89) to re­
fine Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in such a way that (1) becomes 
plausible, at least on his view. According to his final definition, “A system 
performing a given basic function is irreducibly complex if it includes a set of 
well-matched, mutually interacting, nonarbitrarily individuated parts such 
that each part in the set is indispensable to maintaining the system's basic, 
and therefore original, function. The set of these indispensable parts is known 
as the irreducible core of the system." Even with this understanding of the key 
term in (1), however, our question remains about the status of (1)—whether it 
is the central thesis of intelligent design theory.
14. Darwin's Black Box, p. 193; emphasis added in the first sentence.
15. The Design Revolution, p. 34. Cf. the definition offered by the Discovery 
Institute on their website: “The scientific theory of intelligent design holds
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that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by 
an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection."
16. Notice that (1) is not a historical statement, but rather a putative law. It's 
not clear to me whether this fact reflects on Sober's part a view about the types 
of propositions that are allowed to function as the central theses of theories. 
Certainly, however, there are many other theories that make historical state­
ments their central postulates, from Big Bang theory, to the collision-ejection 
theory of the moon's origin, to the Pangaea theory in geology, to the theory 
of common descent in biology. See the discussion by Frederick Suppe in The 
Structure o f Scientific Theories (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 
chap. IV.
17. We might distinguish also the theory o f intelligent cosmological design, 
which alleges the need for a designing intelligence vis-a-vis the basic physical 
constants of the universe. From this theory's central postulate a supernatural 
designer would seem to follow much more obviously than it does from the 
theory of intelligent biological design, assuming it is implausible to suppose 
that our spacetime world is some alien's laboratory experiment
18. Stephen C. Meyer, Marcus Ross, Paul Nelson, and Paul Chien, “The 
Cambrian Information Explosion: Biology's Big Bang," in Darwin, Design, and 
Public Education, ed. John Angus Campbell and Stephen Meyer (Ann Arbor: 
Michigan State University Press, 2003), pp. 323-402 (esp. section V). The au­
thors appeal to other features of organisms originating in the Cambrian explo­
sion as well, at least one of which appears to be the analogue of Behe's concept 
of irreducible complexity.
19. Paul Nelson and Jonathan Wells, “Homology in Biology: Problem for 
Naturalistic Science and Prospect for Intelligent Design," in Darwin, Design, 
and Public Education, pp. 303-22.
20. We must always remember here that the fact that most design theo­
rists themselves will probably believe that auxiliaries do exist that can take us 
from certain propositions they employ to support IBD to a supernatural being 
(by ruling out the sorts of logically possible alternative naturalistic scenarios 
they mention; see Behe, for example, in Darwin's Black Box, p. 249, where he 
states that he finds the naturalistic alternatives unsatisfactory, and in his “Ir­
reducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution," in W. Dembksi and 
M. Ruse, Debating Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
357, where he appears to concede that his arguments “point strongly beyond 
nature") is beside the point, since they may simply be wrong in their belief that 
these auxiliaries exist. The question is never about whether design theorists 
personally believe or hope that a natural theology can be started from one or 
more of these propositions, but whether it can in actuality.
21. For a discussion of the place of methodological principles in theories 
and what he calls research traditions, see chapter 3 of Larry Laudan's Progress 
and its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Laudan's dis­
cussion includes a critical analysis of the views of Kuhn and Lakatos. Cf. Beck­
with's attempt to show that although the bare thesis that variation and natural 
selection explain biological complexity does not entail atheism, Darwinism 
nonetheless entails the non-existence of supernatural agents because (accord­
ing to Beckwith) it is supported by its proponents partly by the principle of 
methodological naturalism, which Beckwith believes entails ontological ma­
terialism (philosophical naturalism). See Law, Darwinism, and Public Education, 
pp. xxiii (note 5), 103, 149, 157. Beckwith is illustrative as well of the tendency 
of some design theorists to portray, or to seem to portray, “Intelligent Design 
Theory" as a whole research paradigm that encompasses not just IBD and 
the biology-specific formulations of the rules for identifying intelligent de­
sign, but the theory of intelligent cosmological design as well, and even views
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about personhood (p. 104) and the metaphysics of morals (p. 105). It is difficult 
to tell in some cases whether these other propositions are to be regarded as 
all part of one paradigm, or just more personal commitments of (all? most?) 
design theorists that are in some way connected with IBD.
22. The exact formulation of the methodological propositions used can be 
crucial here, not just in respect to the metaphysical status of the designer, but 
also in respect to another question frequently raised in reply to IBD and the 
theory of intelligent cosmological design: who designed the designer? Depend­
ing on the methodological principles advanced for identifying the interven­
tion of intelligence, design theorists may or may not be able to forestall an 
infinite regress of designing intelligences.
